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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KRISTE A. PITKIN,

*

Plaintiff and
Apoellant,

*
*

vs.

Case No- 14588

PRESTON'S INCORPORATED and
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH ,
Defendants and
Respondents,

*

*
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant is appealing from an order of the Industrial
Commission denying compensation to Appellant, under Workmen's
Compensation Provisions of the Utah Code Annotated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the order of the Industrial
Commission and a determination of disability suffered by Appellant.

Respondent resists the reversal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Claimant and Appellant was a 23 year old female employed
by the Defendant, Prestonfs Inc., owners and operators of a cafe
in Logan, Utah, known as Dick's Cafe.

Dick's Cafe is also the

-2Greyhound Bus Depot for the Logan Utah area.
The Preston's Inc. first acquired Dick's Cafe and Greyhound
Bus Depot on December 14, 1973, and the Plaintiff-Appellant was an
employee at that time. Workmen's Compensation Insurance was not
obtained by the Corporation at the time through an oversight
of management. {Tr. 80)
On November 20th of 1974, the Claimant filed a Claim for Compensation alleging that on September 19, 1974, she sustained an
injury that occurred "over a period of time of working, caused by
lifting freight."

On January 31, 1974, the Claimant filed an

Amended Application for a hearing alleging that she sustained an
injury on September 28, 1974, which "occurred from lifting freight"
(File)

The Defendant answered the Complaint denying each allega-

tion of the claim*
The evidence introduced by the Applicant is to the effect that
on or about the 28th day of August, 1974, Applicant first stated
that she noticed the pain. (Tr. 11).
She states as follows:
Q,

All right.

Did you incur an injury of any kind that day

while employed?
A*

I can't be sure.

I do remember the pain, and I remember

limping."
Q. You can't be sure of what?
A.
fore.

That it was August 28th.

It could have been the day be-

-3Through various questions, her attorney was able to guide her
into testifying that she felt pain, which radiated down the back
of her leg while working. (Tr.13)
The accident was never reported as such to the management, and
therefore, an investigation of the alleged accident was never made
by

the management.

The Claimant worked without interruption, the

day of the claimed accident and continuously thereafter until she
was terminated in December. (Tr. 14)

The Claimant first saw a phy-

sician concerning her alleged accident on September 5, 1974, seeking aid for a blood clot and a cold and as an incidental matter
asked the doctor to check her leg.
lem as an

,?

early disc."

(Tr. 16)

The doctor diagnosed the probStill the Applicant continued

to work for the corporation until December 19, 1974.
The cross examination of the Applicant brought out inconsistencies of the Applicant's position in this case that she sustained
an injury on August 28th.
Applicant states that the Corporation has her daily employment records, but she then concedes that she wrote daily hours
worked in a book and then destroyed them herself.

There was no

record of the Applicant working on the day in question. (Tr. 21)
Her only retort to the destruction of the records was that if the
Corporation thoughtthat the records were so important, they should
have told her so.
Applicant claims that she made no complaints of back pains

-4prior to the alleged date of the injury September 19th or
September 23th or August 28th. (Tr. 27)

After much discussion,

Applicant finally admitted to the Referee that she had back pains
from lifting many months prior to the alleged injury.

(Tr. 53)

Her co-workers and her witnesses substantiated her admission
as to prior back pains. (Tr.64) ''Nothing serious'.' (Tr.53) . The
back aches I could tolerate,

put on Ben Gay

(Tr.55) .

The applicant worked a total of 55 hours the week of the alleged
injury and the following weeks, she worked 41 and 59 hours respectivel
The Applicant admitted that she made a false statement
of her weight to an insurance company for the purpose of obtaining insurance.
the

She reported her weight at 150 lbs. instead of

actual 190 lbs. The company promptly denied coverage.

The Applicant has been grossly overweight all her life notwithstanding advice of physicians to lose weight both before and
after this claimed injury. (Tr.35).
The Applicant's testimony of the accident itself creates
a picture of confusion.
(Tr. 12)
Q.

Did you incur an injury of any kind that day while

employed,
A.

I can't be sure.

I do remember the pain and remember

limping•
After further prompting, she stated that she "was lifting
freight and I did notice pain." But she went to the doctor for
a cold.(Tr.15)

On cross examination she admitted that she didn't

-5know the date of the injury. (Tr.29).

She canft remember what

she was doing at the time of the injury, but she lifted freight
both before and after the claimed injury. (Tr. 29 & 30)

The Ap-

plicant can't remember lifting any particular item of freight, or
where she was, other than at work. (Tr.47 & 4 8).

The Applicant

does remember that she fell down the stairs at her home in November following the claimed injury and before the notice was filed
with the Industrial Commission.

Her physician substantiates her

admission stating that she sustained , an acute flexion again."
(Tr. 34 & 35). She used crutches after this fall. (Tr. 68)
Heather Hardy, a witness for the Applicant, testified that
she did not know of the claimed injury although they worked together daily before and after the date of the claimed injury untill the Applicant went to Doctor Hirst.

She did mention the fact

of a pain in her leg and that she was limping "about a week after
I returned from a trip home to California the first of August.p
(Tr.67)
Patrick H. Preston, the President of the Defendant's Corporation,
testified that he had never received notice from the Applicant of a
time and a place of the accident.

He further testified that the

Corporation had no records to show that the Applicant had worked
the date claimed by her, although she did work that week.

He test-

ified on several occasions having conversations with Mrs. Pitkin
concerning her weight and posture.
Dr. Hirst's report indicates that the onset of pain spanned a
period of days and conservatiVe*treatment was recommended.

-6A later fall at the home caused an acute flexion and then
surgery was recommended for Mrs. Pitkin.
The Petitioner now seeks to charge her injuries to Defendant
as an industrial "accident11.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE 210- 1
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY IN CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES.
The Appellant states in her brief that there is substantial
creditible and uncontradicted evidence in the record that the
Plaintiff sustained a compensible industrial accident.
It is the law as announced by this Court in many cases that
the Industrial Commission may not act arbitrary or capriciously
in making findings concerning whether or not an injury falls within prevue of the statute.

Baker

Utah 2d 141, 405 P. 2d 613.

vs. Industrial Commission, 17

However, on the other hand, the Indus-

trial Commission acts as a finder of facts and are the sole judges
of the credibility of the witnesses to weigh the evidence the
facts and their decision is final if there is any substantial evidence to sustain it. See Chief Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Industrial Commission 70 Utah 33, 260 P. 2d 277, Board of Education
of Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission 83 Utah 356, 27 P.
2d 805, where the Court said that on a conflict of material and
competent evidence justifying finding for either party the decision
made by the Commission will not be disturbed and in such cases,
credibility of the witness ancTthe weight to be given by their testi-

-7nony is one of fact for the Commission.

See also Park Utah Consoli-

dated Mines vs. Industrial Commission 84 Utah, 481 P. 2d 979, Johnson vs. Industrial Commission 86 Utah 261, 42 P. 2d 996, where the
Court said ''Where the Commission has made its findings and conclusions and denied compensation, it is not for the Court to disturb
them, unless it appears from the record that the Commission has
disregarded competent evidence, substantial in character, and uncontradicted without reasonable basis therefore."
The Commission having found as an ultimate fact that the Applicant did not suffer any injury by accident arising out of or
in the course of her employment and there being evidence in the
record from which the Commission could have found either affirmatively or negatively upon the ultimate issue of fact, this Court
may not disturb the finding of the Commission.
In this case, the records show that the Appellant for some
period of time prior to the alleged injury suffered from backaches which appeared to be a common complaint among the employees
and that the Appellant was as described by her physician, as a "moderately obese woman weighing 190 lbs., and prone to poor posture."
Further reviev/ing the evidence with respect to the relation to the
back problem caused from an industrial accident, the Appellant
at various times in the hearing, stated as follows:
Q.

All right.

Did you incur an injury of any kind that date

while employed?
(Tr. 12)
Q.

Do you know what day-that was on?

A.

I really can't be sure. (Tr. 13)

-8Q.

Did you tell him at that tine you were injured?

A.

Yes.

I told him I was going to the doctor. (Tr. 41)

At an employee's party, the Appellant claims she gave notice
to the owners. (Tr. 42)
Q.

All right.

When did you tell somebody about your injury

and who did you tell?
A.

For one, we had an employees party on September 5th.

was there, so was his wife, and the manager.

Pat

I told him then that

Dr. Hirst said I had a ruptured disc.(Tr. 41 & 42)
Q.

Did you at that time tell anybody about the accident, or

the injury?
A.

Yes.

I told Earl before I was going to the doctor. And

when I come back, I told him what the doctor said about me not being able to life freight anymore. (Tr. 42)
Q.

Now did you ever notify Mr. Preston of the time and the

place of that accident?
A.

No, I didn't.

The date and the time?
Because at the time I didn't think it was

my back. (Tr. 46)
Q.
tell

I don't care about Dr. Steele.

I'm saying did you ever

Halverson, at the time of the accident:

!,

I hurt my back at

such a date, on the time and place."?
A.

No, I didn't.

Not right at the time, no.(Tr. 46)

Q.

And you have never described to this Hearing Examiner what

time of day, what you were doing, or any tiling else, have you?
A.

No. (Tr. 46 &47)

Q.

As to that accident?

-9A.

No.

I can't remember.

Most of the business down there is

freight.
Q.

So you don't remember what you were doing at the time, or

the place?
A.

I was working.

Q.

But you don't remember where you were working?

, A.
Q.

I was working on Greyhound.
All right.

You say that you felt the pain in you back?

A. uh-huh.
Q.

What were you doing at the time you felt this pain in your

A.

Lifting freight.

Q.

What freight?

A.

I can't remember what freight.

back?

Q. How much did it weigh?
A.

I can't remember that either.

I can't remember one piece

that I did pick up, because we were doing that constantly.
Q.

So what you're testifying—What your testimony really

boils down to is that it isn't like whare you cut your finger at
a specific time, and you say:
paring lunch.'1?

"I cut my finger in the kitchen pre-

Your testimony is that at some time during this

period of time you were lifting freight, and you hurt your back;
is that right?
A.

Yes. (Tr. 47-48)

THE REFEREE:
pain?

Do you remember when you first noticed that

-10THE UITNSSS:

Oh, I can't really be sure.

But like if I'd

like sit down, go over to the counter top cind sit down, and then I'd
get up, I couldn't hardly walk.
THE REFEREE:

It was reailly bad.

Do you remember what you were doing?

That is at

what time of day, and what you might have been doing, when you
first felt this pain?
THE WITNESS:

Oh, I really don't know.

I was working ten

hours on the day shift at the time, and I really can't remember
lifting up one certain thing and doing it.
THE REFEREE:

Now in the year or so before, while you were

handling the freight, did you ever have any problems at all from
that?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE REFEREE:

No back aches?

THE WITNESS:

Oh, we all did once in awhile. We'd have

Oh, you know.
it.

I don't know.

We would just get tired from doing

Evelyn had had back problems. (Tr. 50& 51)
At that juncture, the witness admitted for the first time that

she had had prior back problems. This was followed by examination
at Tr. 54.
Q.

So the facts are that you did have some back problems,

even though you called it a back ache, prior to the time of this
injury?
A.

Isn't that right?
Yes, I'd get little small back aches.

I think everybody

does once in a while.
The examination of Mrs. Pitkin was followed by Heather Hardy.

-11She stated as follows:
Q.

Now in June and July of 1974, had you ever heard employees

complain about their backs?
A*

We all complained a little bit.

Q. Including Kriste then, I take it?
A.

Sure.

We would all feel pretty beat at the end of the

shift, after lifting freight. (Tr. 63)
Q.

All right.

Now in the month of August, did Kriste as

far as you know, change any of her habits as far as working during that period of time?
A.

No. We would all be working pretty long shifts during

the summer.
Q.

Do you recall anything that she specifically said to you

during that month?
A.

No.

Q.

Concerning her back I mean?

A.

Not until after she had talked to Dr. Hirst•

Q.

I see.

So that was the first time that you heard any-

thing concerning her back, was when she talked to Dr. Hirst?
A*

Well, we had discussed leg pain, but we didn't know it

was her back. (Tr 65 & 66)
The evidence further shows that although Miss Hardy noticed
the Appellant limping, at no time did the Appellant speak to Hea^
ther Hardy that she hurt her back working.
Q*

Then she didn't say she hurt it working, did she?

A*

No. We didn't know it was her back.

-12Q.

She didn't say she hurt it at home then?

A.

No.

Q.

She gave you no explanation of where this pain cane from,

as far as the injury, or the source of the injury?
A.

No.

Q.

When did she first tell you that she hurt it working?

A.

She never really did.

Q.

So this is the first time you have ever heard that this

injury occurring as a result of employment at Dickfs Cafe then?
A.

No.

Because after she had gone to the doctor, and they

had decided that it was her back, and it could be from lifting
freight, i She hadn't been doing any other strenuous activity, or
lifting anything, so

(Tr. 67)

Relating to the subsequent fall sustained by the Appellant
the following questions were ensued:
Q.

Did you also see it after?

A.

After she fell?

( The limp)

Q. Yes.
A.

She was on crutches for awhile after she fell.

Q.

On crutches did she work?

A.

Yes

Q.

She continued to work even after that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever see her on crutches prior to that fall?

A.

No.

Q.

Where was the fall?

-13A.

At her apartment. (Tr. 68)

The point of the entire testimony is that notwithstanding a
claimed injury by the Appellant, the further question comes up
whether or not the claimed injury was sustained as a result of an
industrial accident and weighinq the evidence as the Commission
had the obligation to do, it apoears that there is a lack of credible evidence showing an industrial accident as required by the
statute.

A possible injury, yes. An industrial accident, no. The

Industrial Commission so found and their findings should be sustained by this Court.

A back injury in an industrial accident sit-

uation is similar to another well known offense in a criminal situation.

It is easy to allege and most difficult to disprove.
ISSUE II

APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO PROMPTLY REPORT THE INJURY DOES BAR
COMPENSATION.
Section 35-1-99 U.C.A.

The State said when an employee claim-

ing to have suffered an injury in the service of the employer, fails
to give notice of the accident and injury incurred and the nature
of the same within 48 hours or fails to report for medical treatment within said time, the compensation provided shall be reduced
by 15%. Notice of the actions is not given within one year from
the date of the accident, the right of compensation shall be barred.
Such is the law.
Defendant's point in raising the question of notice is not
whether or not the action should be barred, but as collateral
evidence tending to disprove the fact that an industrial injury

-14oocurred as alleged by the Appellant.

The testimony of the Plain-

tiff is to the effect that she gave notice within five (5) days
of the accident to the employer.

However, a careful reading of

her language indicates that she complained of a bad back during
this period of time, but none of her testimony specified when,
where, and the causation of the claimed injury.

Certainly, under

any construction, a conversation by an employee to her employer
stating that she had a back injury does not fall within the pravue
of notice, particularly in view of this individual, who was a
moderately obese woman, weighing 190 lbs., poor posture, standing 5'6Tf high and who had complained during the course of her employment of back aches.
ISSUE III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERROR IN FINDING THAT AS A
MATTER OF LAr7 THAT APPLICANT DID NOT SUSTAIN AN INDUSTRIAL INJURY
BY ACCIDENT IN THE COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT.
The Applicant in her initial filing of a claim with the industrial Commission stated that she had sustained an injury which
occurred, "Over a period of time of working, caused by lifting
freight."

Two things are significant in this statement. (1) The

statement over a period of time, which notes not an industrial
accident, but the fact that the claimant due to her overweight
condition, poor posture, prior medical problems, overtaxed the ability of her body to withstand the pressures and thus, over a mat-*
ter of time ruptured a disc in her back. (2) The origination

-15of this phrase, 'lifting freiaht" was not as a result of the injury,
but as a result of a conversation with a physician.
Q.

Then she didnft say she hurt is working, did she?

A.

No. We didn't know it was her back?

Q.

She didn't say she hurt it a home then?

A.

No.

Q.

She gave you no explanation of where this pain came from,

as far as the injury, or source of injury?
A.

No.

Q.

When did she first tell you that she hurt it working?

A.

She never really did.

Q.

So this is the first time you have ever heard that this

injury occurred as a result of employment at Dick's Cafe then?
A*

No.

Because after she had gone to the doctor, and they

had decided that it was her back, and it could be from lifting
the freight.

She hadn't been doing' any other strenuous activity,

or lifting anything, so
Q.

She had a child, didn't she?

A.

Yes. But lifting 30 or 40 pounds is nothing compared to

the freight you're lifting in the freight room*
Q.

Are you aware that she had a fall—

A.

Yes.

Q«
A.

down some stairs?
Yes. That was quite awhile after she had already been

to the doctor.

(Tr. 67)

-16Pintar vs. Industrial Commission of Utah 14 Utah 2d 276, 382
P. 2d 414, where Plaintiff identified two separate injuries to
his back doing mine work, was hospitalized for four days, and
again hurt his back because a drilling machine pushed hin against
the wall for which he received medical attention, but continued
to work.

The Industrial Commission refused to grant an award

of compensation.
The case indicates that there was credible evidence upon which
either an award or denial of award could ba predicated, and therefore, the Court said, ,rIt is, therefore, a pre-requisite to compensation that his disability be shown as a result, not as a gradual
development because of the nature or condition of his work, but
from an identifiable accident or accidents in the course of tha
employment.

There being substantial evidence to support the Com-

mission ls finding to the contrary, no basis exists upon which this
Court could rule that it's denial of compensation was capricious
or arbitrary accordingly, it's order is affirmed.1'

A second case

pertinent to this inquiry is the case of residential and Commercial
Construction Company vs. Eskelson, filed December, 1974, as Filing No. in this Court 13230.

Again, this Court stated that ''The

hearing examiner and the Commission concluded that Eskelson had
suffered an accidental injury and was entitled to compensation
"

Plaintiff has failed to show that the Commission

was arbitrary or capricious and we are in the opinion that the decision of the Commission was abased uoon credible evidence. See
also Redman Warehouse, Inc. vs. Industrial Commission of Utah,

-1722 Utah 2d 398, 454 P. 2d 283, where the Court said, "For ought
we know fron this record, there nay have been any number of reasons why the rupture occurred when and where it did.

Based upon

circumstances quite foreign to the Claimant1s emolovment.

In

other words, there is complete absense of competent proof here
to show any finding with respect to the cause of the rupture
saved by guess work.

In other words, the Claimant has not met

the burden of proving an accident in the course of the employment that caused the injury of which he complains, which burden
is his.1'

Compensation was denied and that the view was upheld by

this Court.
The Appellant faces two oroblems in this case:
1.

Assuming for her benefit that there is, in fact, an in-

jury to her back she must first prove an accident,
2.

That the accident occurred during the course of her em-

ployment .
Coupled with these two problems, is the problem of her credibility • She lied to an insurance company concerning her weight
for purposes of becoming insured and the trial transcript is
repleat with inconsistencies and alterations and changes in her
testimony.

The Defendant relies heavily on the case of Baker vs.

Industrial Commission previously cited in this brief, in which the
secretary claimed

the back injury from working.

Her testimony was to the effect that she was filing papers in
the bottom drawer of a filing cabinet and she felt a sudden sharp

-18oain in her left hio and leg as she stooped down or raised up.
Hence, an identifiable injury during the course of her employment.
She consulted a physician and her testimony was substantiated by
four friends and a completely disinterested waitress.

The Court

said citing other cases, As authority to support the principle
that we affirm the Commission on contradictory evidence, if there
is substantial competent evidence to sustain it, but otherwise,
where there is uncontroverted evidence supported by corraborating
and there is no good reason to believe there is perjury or incredibility f in which latter event any attack thereon must at least
be supported by the record and by accurate findings of fact.

It

is difficult to disagree with the Commission but we believe and
hold that here we have such a case, in which we must disagree with
the Commission on the record and on principle."

The case cited

by the Defendant does not and cannot parallel this case for these
reasons:
1.

This case does not involve substantial competent evidence.

2.

This case does not involve unconbroverted evidence.

3„

This case does not have corraborating evidence.

Therefore, the holding of the Baker case was upon a fact situation, wholly different from the case presented before the Court
at this time.
Hardy.

The Court is directed to the testimony of Heather

Commencing at page 58 of the Transcript, where it appears

that Heather Hardy is an apparent friend of the Appellant, who
worked with her for three months preceding the claimed injury,
stated that through June and July of 1974, she heard Kriste com-

-19plain of bade aches while working long shifts during the sumer.
That Kriste never snecifically said anything to her concerning her
claimed injury.

But she did notice the Appellant limping and she

would sit down and couldn't stand straight after sitting awhile.
There was no claim of the injury during employment.

There also was

no claim of the injury occurring at home nor an explanation where
the pain came from.(Tr. 67)

Until the Appellant went to the doc-

tor, ''They decided that it was her back and it could be from lifting freight.
The referee Questions the witness concerning this point and
the witness stated that after the Aopellant went to the doctor,
they thought she had a crushed disc and she probably acquired it
by the freight.(Tr. 71)

Such testimony separates this case from

the Baker case and makes the Baker case stand apart from the fact
situation of this case.
C O N C L U S I O N
The Industrial Commission has, as required by statute, heard
at least a portion of the case of the Appellant, has had the opportunitv to confront the witnesses, observe their demeanor, observe
personally their testimonyr and has had occasion to review the testimony and the conflicts contained therein.

It has had occasion to

weigh the testimonies of the parties as it relates to the finding
of an injury cause bv an accident during the course of employment*
The record could be interputed to prone evidence tending to show such

-20an accident during employment and on the other hand, the record demonstrates the absense of such accident during the course of employment, notwithstanding, an apparent injury.

The Commission

made a finding based upon the evidence, which finding can be substantiated by the record.

The Supreme Court's

role is not as a

finder of fact, but as a determiner as to whether or not the Commission has correctly applied the law to the facts found.

In this

case, it appears that the Commission elected to disregard certain testimony given by the witness, as being substantial credible and competent and elected to view other evidence given by the
Appellant and treat that evidence as substantial, credible and
competent and there is no abuse of discretion by the Industrial
Commission in electing that course of conduct.

This Court in

the Baker case stated it's reluctance to disagree with the Commission and only did so, upon a finding that the record was barren of any credible evidence to support the Commission's finding.
This Court has said many times that where the evidence is. conflicting as whether or not there was an accident during the course of
-employment, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment
of the Industrial Commission.
Respectfully submitted this

-jP'

day of

1976, which is uncontradicted.
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George W. Preston
Attorney for Respondent
31 Federal Avenue
Bo^an, Utah 84321

-21I hereby certify that I mailed eleven (11) copies of the
foregoing brief of respondent to the Utah Supreme Court of Utah,
two (2) copies to the Industrial Commission of Utah, and two
(2) copies to Gordon J. Low, Attorney for Plaintiff, this 5th
/)

day of August, 1976*
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